Federal Circuit's Bilski Decision - Impact on Software and Business Methods
UPDATE (July 12, 2010):
On June 28, 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s holding that the machine or transformation test was
the sole test for determining
patent eligibility of a process under
35 USC §101.
The Court indicated that business methods, per se are not
unpatentable but it went far enough to note “…while §273 appears to leave
open the possibility of some business method patents, it does not suggest
broad patentability of such claimed inventions.”
The Court was also somewhat courteous to the Federal Circuit inviting it
to “try again” with other formulaic tests to determine patent eligibility
under 35 USC §101. It is also interesting to note the number of references
to Judge Rader’s dissent (at the Federal Circuit). Does this suggest
deference to Chief Judge Rader specifically? If Rader dissents will that
automatically be a strike against a Supreme Court affirmation?
Going forward, it seems abundantly clear that the Federal Circuit’s
machine-or-transformation test is still enormously useful but not completely
dispositive to the issue of patentability. If your claims fail the
machine-or-transformation test, expect substantial resistance from the
PTO,
Board of Appeals and Federal Circuit.
By: Anton Hopen
October 31, 2008
The Federal Circuit decided In Re Bilski yesterday (October 30, 2008) and immediately made some sweeping changes to statutory subject matter analysis. 35 U.S.C. Section 101 recites four categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter. Bilski only addresses “processes.” More specifically, patents involving business methods, tax shelters, financial models and software processes may be impacted.

The Bilski patent claims were directed to hedging risk in the field of commodities trading. The claims did not include any combination of machine or apparatus. Bilski relied on the 1998 Federal Circuit decision in State Street Bank which set out patentability for claims that produced a "useful, concrete and tangible result." The Federal Circuit discarded this test in favor of the machine-or-transformation test. Thus, a process claim must either recite a particular machine or apparatus or transform an article into a different state or thing. The Federal Circuit also warned against “mere insignificant post solution activity.” For example, claiming Pythagorean Theorem could be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques would
not be patentable.
The Bilski decision uses fairly generic language but its target is clearly business methods and software patents. Luckily, it provided some concrete examples of “do’s and “don’ts.”
-
DO: specify the particular
type or nature of data claimed (i.e., bit, string, integer, float);
-
DO: specify how or from
where the data was obtained (i.e., received from database SQL query, intercepted
from HTTP stream, read from text file);
-
DO: indicate what the data
represents (i.e., “a numerical value less than 7 indicating an acidic solution,”
“a latency value of greater than 100 millisecond indicating a packet error”);
-
DO: claim the
transformation of raw data into a new visual depiction of a physical object on a
display;
-
DON’T: claim
undefined “complex systems”;
-
DON’T: claim
indeterminate “factors” drawn from unspecified “testing”;
-
DON’T: assume that
adding a “data gathering” step alone will make an algorithm claim patentable;
-
DO: claim unique
“data gathering” steps applied to an algorithm;
-
DON’T: assume that
adding a “data recording” step alone will make an algorithm claim patentable (In
re. Schrader, 22 F.3d 290).
Unfortunately, the Bilski decision focused primary on “transformation” and not how a machine should be recited to meet the machine-or-transformation test. It is likely that the Federal Circuit and perhaps the Supreme Court will expressly prohibit patent attorneys from “gaming” the test by throwing in a CPU to an algorithm claim.
I anticipate we’ll see Benson (409 U.S. 62 (1972)) come up again in the context of “special purpose” computing devices. Setting meaningful limitations on patentability when reciting a machine might be cumbersome for the courts to enumerate. I propose the following test: Whether the machine collects data from at least one extrinsic source and applies intelligence dynamically without human-derived mental steps to achieve its claimed utility.
The whole purpose of the computer is to automate calculations that would be slow for a person to do manually. However, it must apply some novel intelligence based on outside data to be patentable. Otherwise, the machine is merely a tool facilitating a mental step which is prohibited under 35 U.S.C. 101